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Abstract: 
 
We derive a measure of welfare loss as a proportion of the value of sales 
under quantity-setting symmetric oligopoly in terms of the equilibrium 
industry price elasticity of demand, the number of firms in the industry 
and a conjectural variation term in the context of the standard linear 
model.  This generalises the monopoly measure in James and McHardy 
(1997). 
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AN ELASTICITY MEASURE OF WELFARE LOSS IN SYMMETRIC OLIGOPOLY 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Economists have long held concerns about the accuracy and consistency of profit 
reporting and the use of accounting rates of return to infer economic rates of return 
(e.g., see Schmalensee, 1989). However, cases in recent years such as Enron and 
WorldCom have further undermined confidence in reported profit figures, 
rendering as potentially impotent those elements of the regulator’s toolkit that rely 
upon profit measures.  One such tool is the Harberger (1954) deadweight loss 
triangle (henceforth DWL).  Existing techniques used to measure this DWL rely upon 
estimates of industry profit or price-cost margins (e.g., Cowling and Mueller, 1981 
and Dixon et al., 2001).  This paper derives an alternative to the existing profit-
based measures of DWL which relies instead upon industry demand elasticities that 
are less subject to manipulation.  
2. THE MEASURE 
 Consider an industry with n identical firms facing the inverse linear demand 
function,1 
  𝑃 = 𝛼 − 𝛽𝑋,                                                                                                                     [1] 
where 𝑃, 𝑋 and 𝑥𝑖  are, respectively, the levels of price, industry output and firm 
output (𝑋 =  𝑥𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1 ) and 𝛼 and 𝛽 are positive constants.  
                                                 
1
 Eq. [1] is based upon a standard quadratic quasi-linear utility function making the later welfare measure a 
valid one. 
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 Given constant marginal costs, c (0 ≤ 𝑐 < 𝛼), profit maximisation yields an 
optimal individual output for firm i of  
  𝑥𝑖 =
𝛼−𝑐
𝛽(1+𝑛+𝛾𝑖𝑗 (𝑛−1))
 ,                [2] 
where 𝛾𝑖𝑗 =
𝑑𝑥𝑗
𝑑𝑥𝑖
.
𝑥𝑖
𝑥𝑗
 (𝑖 ≠ 𝑗 = 1, … , 𝑛) expresses firm i’s expectation of j’s 
proportionate output reaction to a change in 𝑥𝑖  and may be interpreted as a 
measure of the implicit collusiveness of the industry: 𝛾𝑖𝑗 = 1  [𝛾𝑖𝑗 = 0] implies 
perfect collusion [Cournot].2 Given symmetry we drop arguments on this term.   
 Summing Eq. [2] over all n firms, gives equilibrium industry output,3 
  𝑋 =
𝑛(𝛼−𝑐)
𝛽(1+𝑛+𝛾(𝑛−1))
 .                                                                                                          [3] 
Substituting Eq. [3] in Eq. [1] yields the equilibrium price, 
  𝑃 =
𝛼 1+𝛾 𝑛−1  +𝑛𝑐
(1+𝑛+𝛾(𝑛−1))
 .               [4] 
PROPOSITION 1: Under symmetric n-firm oligopoly with linear demand and constant 
marginal cost, the common conjectural variation term is bounded from below 
according to  
 𝛾 > −
1
𝑛−1
.                [5] 
PROOF 1: From the second order condition for a maximum, we have that,  
 
𝑑
𝑑𝑥𝑖
 𝛼 − 𝑐 − 𝛽{ 2 + 𝛾 𝑛 − 1  𝑥𝑖 +  𝑥𝑗𝑗≠𝑖 } < 0,  
  
                                                 
2
 Use of a conjectural variation term to characterise conduct in oligopoly models is commonplace (e.g., 
Clarke and Davis, 1982, Dixit and Stern, 1982, Cable et al., 1994, and Dixon et al., 2001). Whilst the 
approach has its critics (see Shapiro, 1989), it also has its exponents (see Bresnahan, 1989, and Fraser, 
1994).   
3
 As is well known, this equilibrium if only Nash in the case of 𝛾 = 0.   
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Hence,  
 –𝛽 2 + 𝛾 𝑛 − 1 + 𝛾 𝑛 − 1  < 0.   
Since 𝛽 > 0, we require  .  > 0.                              Q.E.D. 
COROLLARY: Eq. [5] ensures that the denominator of 𝑋 is strictly positive, hence in 
the usual case where 𝛼 − 𝑐 > 0, it also guarantees 𝑋 > 0. 
PROPOSITION 2: Under symmetric n-firm oligopoly with linear demand and constant 
marginal cost, equilibrium deadweight loss as a proportion of sales value, W, can be 
expressed as follows (where 𝜂 is the industry point price elasticity of demand), 
 𝑊 = −
(1+𝛾 𝑛−1 )2
2𝜂𝑛2
 .                                                                                                         [6] 
PROOF 2: The general expression for welfare loss as a percentage of sales value with 
linear demand and constant marginal cost is given by  
 𝑊 =
 𝑃−𝑐 (𝑋 −𝑋)
2𝑃𝑋
=
 𝑃−𝑐 2
2𝛽𝑃𝑋
 ,              [7] 
where 𝑋 =
𝛼−𝑐
𝛽
 is the competitive industry output.   
 Manipulating Eq. [1] we have,  
 
1
𝜂
= −𝛽
𝑋
𝑃
 ,                [8] 
where =
𝑑𝑋
𝑑𝑃
.
𝑃
𝑋
 .  Using Eq. [8] in Eq. [7],  
 𝑊 = −
𝜂 𝑃−𝑐 2
2𝑃2
 .               [9] 
Using Eq. [3], Eq. [4] and Eq. [8], we have, 
  
𝑃−𝑐
𝑃
= −
1+𝛾(𝑛−1)
𝜂𝑛
 .             [10] 
Using Eq. [10] in Eq. [9] completes the proof.        Q.E.D. 
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COROLLARY: Under 𝑛 = 1 or 𝛾 = 1, Eq. [6] reproduces the monopoly measure in 
James and McHardy (1997), 
 𝑊𝑚 = −
1
2𝜂
 . 
In order to complete the discussion, we consider the properties of the term 𝛾 and 
the implications for our measure, Eq. [6]. 
DEFINITION 1: Let 
 𝛾∗ = inf  𝛾: 𝛾 > −
1
𝑛−1
 .             [11] 
DEFINITION 2: The set of values of n for which the equilibrium can be affected by 𝛾 
(i.e. positive integers excluding 𝑛 = 1), is  
 𝑁 =  𝑛: 𝑛 ∈ ℤ+, 𝑛 ≠ 1 .   
PROPOSITION 3:4  
(i) For a given 𝑛 ∈ 𝑁, as 𝛾 → 𝛾∗, 𝑊 → 0: welfare approaches the competitive 
outcome. 
(ii) 𝑊 → 0 as 𝛾 → 𝑘 where 𝛾 ∈ (−1,0) and 𝑘 is strictly monotonic in n.  
PROOF 3: It follows from Definition 1 that inf{𝑁} = 2 and sup{𝑁} = ∞.  From Eq. 
[11] we have 𝛾∗(𝑛 = 2) = −1, lim
𝑛→∞
𝛾∗ → 0− and 𝛾∗ is strictly monotonic in 𝑛 ∈ 𝑁.  
For a given level of 𝑛 ∈ 𝑁, 
 lim
𝛾→𝛾∗
 1 + 𝛾 𝑛 − 1  = 0.              [12] 
                                                 
4
 The case for 𝑛 = 2 is well known. 
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It remains to show that the denominator of Eq. [6] does not approach zero as 
𝛾 → 𝛾∗.  Using Eq. [3] and Eq. [4] in Eq. [9], we have that the equilibrium level of  𝜂 
is  
 𝜂 = −
𝛼 1+𝛾 𝑛−1  +𝑛𝑐
𝑛(𝛼−𝑐)
 . 
Given Eq. [12], 
 lim
𝛾→𝛾∗
𝜂 = −
𝑐
(𝛼−𝑐)
 ,             [13] 
which is invariant with respect to 𝛾.  Hence, using Eq. [12] and Eq. [13] in Eq. [6], 
 lim
𝛾→𝛾∗
𝑊 = 0.           Q.E.D. 
3. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
Eq. [6] offers a relatively simple empirical measure of DWL as a proportion of sales 
value based upon observables n and 𝜂 and a parameter 𝛾, thus avoiding the need to 
rely upon reported profit figures or price-cost margins.  Use of the parameter 𝛾 has 
its critics and exponents.  However, as Vives (1999, p.186) notes, “..the conjectural 
variation approach has proved useful in applied work because it parameterizes the degree 
of competition in a market...”, which is exactly its purpose here.  
 Theoretical studies of DWL often refer to welfare losses as a proportion of first-
best welfare rather than sales value (e.g., Corchón, 2008, and Anderson and Renault, 
2003).  Empirically, this is problematic as it requires assumptions about the form of 
demand (underlying utility) to be global rather than local.  Our measure, by 
referring to sales value, eliminates this problem.  Furthermore, in the context of 
applied policy work reference to sales value (an indicator of the size/commercial 
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importance of the industry) is likely to be more easily communicated and 
understood.   
 Finally, it is important to note that the assumed symmetry of our model will tend 
to bias DWL downwards (e.g., Corchón, 2008).  
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